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Revolution and Aftermath: 
B.C. Health Services and Its 
Implications 
Robin K. Basu* 
I. DISCLAIMER AND CONSTRAINTS 
The thoughts presented in this paper are offered with a disclaimer 
and some limiting constraints that should be stated at the outset.  
First, the disclaimer: the observations in this paper emerge from the 
crucible of defeat in litigation. The writer was counsel for an intervening 
provincial Attorney General in the B.C. Health Services1 case. Although 
the province’s intervention was agnostic about the wisdom of the British 
Columbia legislation at issue, it was opposed to the expansion of section 
2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 that was called for 
by the health care unions. The intervention focused on the implications for 
both public and private sector labour relations, section 2(d) and section 
15(1) jurisprudence and Charter jurisprudence generally. The government 
side was successful in resisting the section 15(1) Charter claim in B.C. 
Health Services, but the decision on section 2(d) represents a set-back for 
government’s ability to set public policy without the spectre of 
constitutional litigation and judicial intervention.  
Second, the writer is a practising government counsel and his views 
are necessarily informed by the perspective of being “in government”, 
and thus, of being aware of the challenges governments and their 
advisers confront as a result of constitutional uncertainty. The writer’s 
                                                                                                             
*
 Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. The 
views and doubts expressed in this paper are the writer’s own and are expressed in his personal 
capacity only. They are not to be taken as the views of the Government of Ontario. The writer is 
indebted to his very smart colleagues and friends, including in particular Robert Charney, with 
whom he has spent much time trying to tease out the meaning and implications of the brave new s. 
2(d) world. 
1
 Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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perspective is that of someone whose job it is to try to assist government 
achieve its public policy objectives within the ambit of constitutional 
limits. When constitutional limits cannot be delineated with a tolerable 
degree of certainty, governments and their advisers are naturally 
frustrated. 
Third, governments face pressing labour issues, in both the public 
and private sectors, virtually every day. As counsel to government on 
these live issues, the writer cannot speak his mind freely on all the 
implications raised by B.C. Health Services. As a result, the writer may 
be somewhat more reserved here in elaborating the dangers of the B.C. 
Health Services revolution in labour and public policy than he is when 
discussing the matter with his colleagues. 
II. AN UNSATISFACTORY REVOLUTION 
It was immediately recognized that the decision in B.C. Health 
Services represents a revolution in the Supreme Court’s thinking about 
section 2(d) and labour relations.  
As with revolutions in general, however, after the initial euphoria — 
or panic — associated with dramatic and perhaps unexpected change, 
there are inevitable questions about what the future holds. In the case of 
B.C. Health Services, these questions come from all quarters: organized 
labour, management (both public and private sector) and government 
itself. 
Like a revolution, B.C. Health Services appears to be more a 
rejection of the old order than an articulated vision of the future. It is 
hard to discern what comes next, where we are headed. The 
jurisprudential structure of the past has been swept away, with very little 
guidance as to what is expected to replace it. We do not know if the 
Court was unable to give us better guidance because the justices were 
unable to come to agreement on a direction forward and the judgment 
we have is the best achievable consensus. It is possible that they did not 
offer more as it was not necessary to do so to dispose of the case. 
Another possibility is that the judgment was crafted to create legal 
uncertainty for unions, employers and government, so as to encourage 
these parties to bargain their differences in lieu of litigating or 
legislating. If this latter possibility is in fact the case, only time will tell 
whether the gambit will succeed. 
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III. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM 
We begin with what the writer believes to be at the root of the 
problems posed by the B.C. Health Services decision. It is a fundamental 
misconception that treats the activity of collective bargaining as an 
exercise of freedom. From this misconception the problems and 
unresolved questions of the decision arise. 
With B.C. Health Services the Supreme Court has taken an activity, 
collective bargaining, that was thought to be part and parcel of a 
comprehensive statutory regime — with correlative rights and obligations, 
and a fair measure of statutory prescription (some would call it coercion) 
— and reinterpreted it as the exercise of a fundamental freedom under the 
Charter.  
Yet if a formal amendment process had been undertaken to extend 
constitutional protection to the modern statutory role of organized labour 
in collective bargaining (or if the matter had been given thorough 
consideration when the Charter was enacted),3 this writer posits that such 
constitutional protection would most likely not have found expression as 
a fundamental freedom, i.e., in section 2 of the Charter. The fundamental 
freedoms — of conscience, religion, expression, association, peaceful 
assembly — are quintessentially liberal protections.4 Protections for the 
modern statutory role of organized labour — at least as far as collective 
bargaining is concerned — are not. Collective bargaining is, to put it 
simply, a poor fit in section 2.  
If a considered decision had been made to include collective 
bargaining rights under the Charter, they would likely have been 
included in a separate section, or group of sections, entitled Labour 
Rights, or Labour Protections or Collective Bargaining Rights. Such 
provisions would have specified with some degree of particularity: (a) 
who is the right holder (a union member, union, or some other 
collectivity); (b) to what extent do the labour rights impose correlative 
                                                                                                             
3
 That is, consideration beyond the motion before the Special Joint Parliamentary 
Committee to add to s. 2(d) the words “including the freedom to organize and bargain collectively”, 
which was defeated by a vote of 20-2. See Dianne Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the 
Charter” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 371. It was in opposing this motion that the Acting 
Minister of Justice made a comment upon which the Court has now placed so much weight: B.C. 
Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 67. See discussion below. 
4
 Despite some halting steps towards the recognition of “positive rights” within s. 2(b) and 
2(d), s. 2 rights are still generally, and the writer would submit correctly, understood as restraints on 
government authority and action: Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 
(S.C.C.), Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”].  
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obligations on governments and private sector actors; (c) what is the 
relationship between various labour rights holders — what are their 
mutual rights and obligations; (d) what is the relationship between 
collective agreements and democratically enacted laws; and (e) what 
limits, including the economic and budgetary constraints of private and 
public sector actors, may legitimately affect protected labour rights. 
What we have instead, as a result of the Court’s reinterpretation of 
collective bargaining as an exercise of fundamental freedom, is that the 
Charter has effectively been amended by judicial decision to add an 
entirely new breed of “fundamental freedom”, constitutionally 
guaranteeing what was formerly only the statutory role of organized 
labour. Indeed, based on some of the Court’s comments it is possible 
that what has been inserted in section 2(d) of the Charter is a nascent 
constitutional labour code — albeit one whose terms, rather than being 
spelled out clearly in the manner of the Labour Relations Act,5 must be 
discerned by a mix of extrapolation, inference and conjecture.  
In the writer’s respectful view, the nine operative words of section 
2(d) — “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: … (d) 
freedom of association” — cannot do this much work. Neither is section 
1, certainly as it has been interpreted to date, a well-crafted tool for 
delineating the circumstances in which the public interest or even 
balanced labour policy can take priority over collective bargaining 
rights. 
IV. SOME UNION ACTIVITIES ARE AN EXERCISE OF  
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
The misconception about collective bargaining begins by mixing up 
those activities of labour unions that truly are exercises of freedom of 
association with those that unions undertake pursuant to a statutorily 
assigned role.  
No one doubts that organizing efforts by a labour union to grow its 
membership are associational. Unions attempt to persuade individuals to 
join them in common cause to achieve a variety of goals. Where an 
individual has a choice as to whether or not he or she wishes to establish, 
join, or remain in, a union, this is clearly an exercise of freedom of 
association, and this is no different in respect of any voluntary association, 
whether it be a political party, a trade association, a lobby group or a social 
                                                                                                             
5
 In Ontario: Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A. 
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or other club. State interference with such organizing activities (“the 
freedom to establish and maintain an association”) engages section 2(d). 
This is not controversial, and was easily recognized by the Court from the 
early days of its section 2(d) jurisprudence.6  
Similarly, if the group pursuit of an activity is prohibited or 
restricted, whereas the individual pursuit of the same activity is not, this 
also engages section 2(d), and this again has long been recognized in the 
Court’s section 2(d) jurisprudence.7 
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL ANALOGUE TEST: DUNMORE 
Where the Court may arguably have taken a wrong turn in its early 
section 2(d) jurisprudence was in treating these two categories of section 
2(d) protection as virtually exhaustive.8 In particular, it was thought that 
                                                                                                             
6
 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 
1 S.C.R. 313, at 363, per Dickson C.J.C., 391, per LeDain J. and 407, per McIntyre J. (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. 
Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 401-402 
(S.C.C.), per Sopinka J. [hereinafter “Professional Institute”]. 
7
 Alberta Reference, id., at 407-409, per McIntyre J., and Professional Institute, id., at 
401-402. The controversy that often arises in relation to this category of s. 2(d) protection is not 
with respect to its inclusion within the scope of s. 2(d), but in its application in particular cases. It 
may be contended, for example, that a state prohibition on certain forms of business or trade 
association is aimed at preventing a group from doing what is lawful for individuals. For example, it 
is said that preventing or restricting a multi-disciplinary partnership between different groups of 
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, engages s. 2(d), because the practice of law and 
accountancy are lawful activities permitted to qualified individuals. The answer to this contention is 
that law and accountancy are also lawful for groups. What is restricted is the practice of law and 
accountancy together in one business entity, and this is prohibited both for individual lawyers and 
accountants, as well as for groups of those respective professionals. In other words, the activity of 
engaging in a “joint law-accountancy practice” is prohibited for all, and not merely for groups. 
Similarly, restricting the ability of a group of willing farmers to sell their products outside a 
marketing regime to a group of willing buyers does not engage s. 2(d) because the relevant 
prohibition is of the association, by contract, of buyer with seller, not of sellers with each other. In 
the marketing scheme individual sellers (and buyers) are treated the same as group sellers (and 
buyers). It is the activity of contracting between buyer and seller that is restricted for both 
individuals and groups. (Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision on this very fact pattern in 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 
(S.C.C.), does not articulate this analysis fully, but rather rests on proposition that while s. 2(d) may 
protect a trading association it does not protect the activity of trading, and the somewhat bald, albeit 
undoubtedly accurate, proposition that s. 2(d) is not intended to protect all economic associations.) 
The characterization of what activity is in fact lawful in such cases will determine whether s. 2(d) is 
engaged. Some may regard this as an artificial or arbitrary dependence on categories, but the reality 
is that the delineation of all legal rights, even those protected as Charter rights, depends to some 
extent on such characterizations.  
8
 The Court’s recognition in its early jurisprudence, e.g., Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, 
at 391, per Le Dain J., at 407, per McIntyre J. and Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 401-402, 
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unless a given activity could be pursued lawfully by an individual, that 
mere fact (the absence of a so-called “individual analogue”) disentitled the 
activity from section 2(d) protection. It was not until 2001, in the Court’s 
decision in Dunmore,9 that this situation was corrected.  
Dunmore advanced the theoretical understanding of section 2(d) by 
explaining (in a passage that was in fact obiter)10 that the demonstration 
by a claimant that the state has prohibited an activity pursued in 
association but not the individual analogue of that activity is not the only 
circumstance where a section 2(d) breach may be found. To put it 
another way, a showing that the state has interfered with an association’s 
activities, but has not restricted the same activity when pursued by an 
individual, is a most useful indicium of a section 2(d) infringement, but 
it is not the sine qua non. The impairment of an activity that lacks an 
individual analogue thus can constitute an infringement of section 2(d), 
although it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding a 
breach.11  
As Dunmore pointed out (drawing upon Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in 
the Alberta Reference),12 not every human endeavour that is pursued in 
association has an individual analogue. Dunmore recognized that some 
associational activities (such as the formation of a majority platform) do 
not or cannot have an individual analogue since they are, by their nature, 
interpersonal or social.13  
Some associational activities that necessarily do not have an 
individual analogue include (and here the writer is expanding and 
generalizing upon some of the examples cited in Dunmore): 
                                                                                                             
per Sopinka J., of a category in addition to the two mentioned here, extending s. 2(d)’s protection to 
the constitutional rights of individuals when pursued in association is clearly redundant or as 
Dickson C.J.C. put it “derivative”: Alberta Reference, id., at 364, per Dickson C.J.C. The 
constitutional rights are protected in any event; and the protection of activities pursued by a group 
which an individual may lawfully pursue clearly encompasses the constitutionally protected 
activities of individuals. 
9
 Supra, note 4. 
10
 What was found to be an infringement of s. 2(d) in Dunmore, id., was an impairment of 
the ability of farm workers to establish and maintain workers’ associations to assert their interests 
against private farm employers, which falls well within the scope of the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence on what s. 2(d) protects. What was controversial in Dunmore was not the finding on 
this point, but rather the Court’s attribution of responsibility to the state for the inability of farm 
workers to organize, thus justifying the Court’s order that the state had to enact legislation 
protecting organizing efforts.  
11
 Dunmore, id., at paras. 16-18. 
12
 Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 367, per Dickson C.J.C. 
13
 Dunmore, supra, note 4, at paras. 16-17. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) REVOLUTION AND AFTERMATH 171 
 adopting a model for group decision-making (such as consensus 
decision-making, majoritarian decision-making, or decision-making 
based on the support of a plurality of a group’s members; open 
balloting or secret balloting); 
 choosing a leader or spokesperson; 
 developing a platform or shared vision; 
 adopting or amending a constitution; 
 establishing criteria for membership in a group, or criteria for 
exclusion; 
 expelling dissenters, or welcoming or readmitting dissenters; 
 federating, or sub-dividing or splitting; 
 debating; 
 team-building; 
 engaging in competition amongst members of a group; 
 pooling resources. 
Many of these embrace union activities of a centrally associational 
nature, and Dunmore removed the barrier to their being protected by 
section 2(d). 
This does not mean, of course, that to impair an activity that lacks an 
individual analogue is to breach section 2(d). Dunmore explicitly 
recognized this:  
… the law must recognize that certain union activities — making 
collective representations to an employer, adopting a majority political 
platform, federating with other unions — may be central to freedom of 
association even though they are inconceivable on the individual level. 
This is not to say that all such activities are protected by s. 2(d) nor that 
all collectivities are worthy of constitutional protection; indeed, this 
Court has repeatedly excluded the right to strike and collectively 
bargain from the protected ambit of s. 2(d).14 
Some human activities that lack an individual analogue are the scourge 
of humanity. Engaging in warfare, excluding individuals or minorities from 
group participation on racial or other invidious grounds, suppressing the 
views or goals of dissenters, assimilating minorities, plotting conspiracies, 
establishing trade cartels: these are human endeavours that can really only 
be pursued in association, and yet that mere fact would not favour their 
protection under the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
14
 Dunmore, id., at para. 17. 
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VI. PROTECTION FOR AN ASSOCIATION’S OBJECTS 
Dunmore, by rejecting the individual analogue test for a section 2(d) 
claim, was taken by some to herald an “opening of the door” to the 
protection of the objects of associations, including what was said to be a 
key object of trade unions — collective bargaining.15  
However, the rejection in Dunmore of the individual analogue 
requirement does not in principle extend section 2(d) protection to one 
particular class of association’s objects or activities, even if it is claimed 
that the object or activity is essential or foundational to the association. It 
merely removes an obstacle that, before Dunmore, would have been fatal 
to the claim for section 2(d) protection of those union activities that lack 
individual analogues. 
Dunmore did not reject the concept that section 2(d) protects only 
the association not its objects, even if the objects are the reason for the 
association’s existence. This point had been made in the Alberta 
Reference16 by reference to the example of a gun club, which does not by 
its existence as an association extend section 2(d) protection to gun 
ownership, possession or use simply by virtue of the fact that these are 
the foundational objects of the club. That a ban on guns would frustrate 
the very objects of the association, undermining the meaningfulness of 
its existence as an association, does not render the gun ban vulnerable to 
attack under section 2(d). The legislation does not, in banning guns, 
attack the association qua association. Justice Sopinka adopted this form 
of argument in the Professional Institute case to reject the claim that 
without constitutional protection for the activity of collective bargaining 
the freedom of association of trade unions is meaningless.17 Similarly, in 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, in a non-labour context, 
the Court repeated that a prohibition on marketing of farm products 
outside a regulatory scheme does not impair the freedom of association 
of a farm marketing association.18 Only the association’s activity of 
marketing is affected by the legislation, not the association itself. This is 
                                                                                                             
15
 See e.g., the references to union counsel’s arguments in Health Services and Support-
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2107, 19 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 37, at para. 96 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services, BCSC”], affd [2004] B.C.J. No. 
1354, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 175, at paras. 31-32, 67-68 [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services, BCCA”]. 
16
 Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 404-405. 
17
 Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 402, per Sopinka J. 
18
 Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, supra, note 7, at paras. 108-12. 
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so, even though marketing was the raison d’être of the association and 
its prohibition would render the association “meaningless”. 
Dunmore stated, “the purpose of s. 2(d) commands a single inquiry: 
has the state precluded activity because of its associational nature, 
thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals?”19 It also 
quoted Dickson C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent on the same point: 
“The legislative purpose which will render legislation invalid is the 
attempt to preclude associational conduct because of its concerted or 
associational nature.”20 In the same vein, Dickson C.J.C. had also stated:  
What freedom of association seeks to protect is not associational 
activities qua particular activities, but the freedom of individuals to 
interact with, support, and be supported by, their fellow humans in the 
varied activities in which they choose to engage. But this is not an 
unlimited constitutional license for all group activity. The mere fact 
that an activity is capable of being carried out by several people 
together, as well as individually, does not mean that the activity 
acquires constitutional protection from legislative prohibition or 
regulation.21 
Dunmore concluded on this point by stating that, “a purposive approach 
to s. 2(d) demands that we ‘distinguish between the associational aspect 
of the activity and the activity itself’”.22 
All of this is more consistent with the view that section 2(d) does not 
protect activities just because they are the foundational objects of an 
association23 than the proposition advanced by the dissenters in the 1990 
                                                                                                             
19
 Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 16 (emphasis added). 
20
 Dunmore, id., at para. 16, quoting Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 367, per Dickson 
C.J.C. (emphasis added). 
21
 Alberta Reference, id., at 366, per Dickson C.J.C. 
22
 Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 18. 
23
 Chief Justice Dickson was prepared to extend protection to collective bargaining and the 
right to strike, partly because he thought, “If freedom of association only protects the joining 
together of persons for common purposes, but not the pursuit of the very activities for which the 
association was formed, then the freedom is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid”: Alberta 
Reference, supra, note 6, at 362-63, per Dickson C.J.C. But his comment quoted in the text above 
(cited supra, note 21) that s. 2(d) should not protect an activity merely because it is carried on in 
association implies that s. 2(d) also does not protect an activity merely because it is the foundational 
object or raison d’être of an association. It would not make sense if it were held that s. 2(d) does not 
protect activities merely because they could be carried on in association, but does in fact protect 
activities that are foundational to an association. A given activity, not otherwise protected, would 
acquire protection simply by becoming an activity foundational to a particular association. Bringing 
a given activity within the scope of s. 2(d)’s protection would be a matter of limiting the 
association’s objects to the activity in question. Unlike a tax shelter, constitutional protection should 
not be achievable merely by the craft of a clever solicitor. 
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Professional Institute case that collective bargaining attracts section 2(d) 
protection because it is the raison d’être of a union.24  
With Dunmore the terms of section 2(d) debate had not fundamentally 
changed, and the Court continued to work within the basic principled 
framework established in the Alberta Reference and Professional Institute 
cases, albeit with an important, and probably valid limitation on the 
significance of the individual analogue test. 
VII. THE UNIONS’ CLAIMS IN B.C. HEALTH SERVICES — 
ARTICULATION AND CRITIQUE 
1. The “Freedom” Claim 
In B.C. Health Services, the unions presented their claims in the form 
of a classical section 2 claim: that of government interference in a freedom 
protected by the Charter. Unlike the situation in, for example, Dunmore or 
Delisle v. Canada,25 which involved exclusions from a whole collective 
bargaining regime, the legislation at issue in B.C. Health Services lent itself 
to the union’s characterization of their claims, since it constrained an 
activity — collective bargaining — that formerly, it was claimed, the 
unions had been “free” to engage in unencumbered by legislative 
restrictions on what could be bargained.  
The unions claimed that by setting aside terms in previously “freely” 
negotiated collective agreements and precluding “free” negotiations over 
certain terms in future collective agreements (substituting legislated 
terms instead), the B.C. legislation was interfering in three “core labour 
freedoms”: 
(1) the freedom to make collective representations to one’s employers; 
(2) the freedom to negotiate and agree on the terms and conditions of 
employment in a collective manner; and,  
(3) the ability to rely on and enforce those agreements which are 
collectively concluded.26 
The first of these enumerated freedoms — the freedom to make 
collective representations — is not controversial. It is a freedom 
                                                                                                             
24
 Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 381-83, per Cory J. 
25
 Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 
(S.C.C.). 
26
 B.C. Health Services, BCCA, supra, note 15, at paras. 30 and 70. See also Appellants’ 
Factum in the Supreme Court of Canada, paras. 27, 33-36, 74, 88-114, 125. 
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specifically mentioned in Dunmore.27 Quite apart from Dunmore, this 
freedom is protected in the public sector context by the operation of section 
2(b) and (d) of the Charter, and the principle that section 2(d) protects the 
exercise in association of the constitutional rights or freedoms of 
individuals.28 This freedom does not, however, encompass collective 
bargaining, as collective bargaining involves much more than the 
presentation of collective representations to an employer. 
The second and third of these claimed freedoms are controversial. The 
third, “the ability to rely upon and enforce” agreements, is not a claim for 
freedom at all, but a demand for the legal enforcement by the state of 
bargains concluded collectively. Such enforceability is essential to give 
effect to the second claimed freedom, the freedom to bargain collectively. 
As such, the second and third claimed freedoms may be read together as 
“the freedom to collectively bargain and conclude binding agreements 
without state interference”.  
Interestingly this claimed freedom has a readily recognizable, and in 
some quarters notorious, individual analogue: laissez-faire freedom of 
contract.29  
Naturally, the unions in B.C. Health Services did not put their claim 
forward as starkly as a claim for laissez-faire freedom of contract. The 
B.C. Court of Appeal encapsulated the claimants’ position on the second 
and third claimed freedoms by quoting from their submissions: 
The appellants’ ultimate position is that … “Regardless of what labour 
relations scheme a province may choose to enact regarding collective 
bargaining, it cannot prohibit the collective negotiation and 
enforcement of employment agreements. While there may not be a right 
to any particular labour relations framework, there is at least a right to 
remain free from state interference in carrying out this type of 
collective activity.”30 
A look at the individual analogue to this claimed collective freedom — 
individual freedom of contract — sheds light on the problems with the 
unions’ claim.  
                                                                                                             
27
 Dunmore, supra, note 4, at para. 17. 
28
 Alberta Reference, supra, note 6, at 391, per Le Dain J., at 407, per McIntyre J.; 
Professional Institute, supra, note 6, at 401-402, per Sopinka J. 
29
 See Robert E. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia 
Health Services Case and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (2007-2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65. 
30
 B.C. Health Services, BCCA, supra, note 15, at para. 33 (emphasis added). See also 
Appellants’ Factum in the Supreme Court, paras. 27, 33-36, 74, 88-114, 125. 
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First, it is trite that, especially in the sphere of employment, there is 
no unrestrained freedom of contract. The unions contended that the state, 
having established a scheme that leaves certain prescribed parties free to 
settle the terms of a contract, cannot withdraw that freedom and impose 
contractual terms. Such an argument is not materially different from a 
claim that having permitted individual employees and employers to 
agree to terms of employment above the minimum standards prescribed 
by the Employment Standards Act, the state cannot by legislation set 
aside agreed-upon terms or impose new terms of employment. We know 
that that is not true. The unions’ argument is also not materially different 
from a claim that having adopted a laissez-faire posture to the labour 
market in the 19th century the state was then precluded from legislating 
employment standards or adopting labour relations codes in the 20th and 
21st centuries. Yet we know that state regulation of employment 
relationships has been a hallmark of post-19th century labour relations 
policy, and it is indisputable that organized labour has been a primary 
beneficiary of such state intervention. We have a situation where the 
unions cannot claim that an activity lawfully open to individuals is not 
open when carried on collectively by associations. Unrestrained freedom 
of contract is lawfully prohibited for both individuals and collectivities. 
Second, and more significantly, the unions’ claimed “freedom of 
collective bargaining” is quite inseparable from a complex and prescriptive 
statutory regime that establishes a process for the fixing of terms and 
conditions of employment at certain workplaces. The unions’ recharac-
terization of but one aspect of that prescriptive statutory scheme as a 
“freedom” may have some rhetorical value, but it hardly reflects what the 
statutory scheme provides and how it actually works.  
The statutory regime in question, like the labour relations model 
prevalent in North America, prescribes that all workers in a given 
bargaining unit (as defined by law) are to be represented exclusively by a 
bargaining agent certified by a board31 established by legislation. 
Workers who dissent from the majority’s choice of bargaining agent are 
nonetheless bound to representation by that agent. The employer is 
compelled by the statute to bargain terms and conditions of employment 
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with the bargaining agent, and is prohibited from bargaining with anyone 
else, thus ensuring that the bargaining agent has a statutory monopoly on 
the labour available to the employer. Both employer and bargaining 
agent have a “duty to bargain”, enforced by the state. The statute 
prescribes sanctions, in the event of a breach of the duty to bargain, and 
regulates resort to economic remedies (such as strikes and lock-outs) 
available to the parties in the event of a failure of negotiations.32  
The unions’ real claim in B.C. Health Services, therefore, was a 
claim that the state, having set up a regime which gives certified 
bargaining agents exclusive representation on behalf of labour at the 
workplace, having imposed a statutory duty to bargain on the bargaining 
agents and the employers, and having prescribed remedies and sanctions 
in the event of default, was: (1) in some cases, “interfering” with the 
“freely contracted” terms that the bargaining agents and employers 
reached, and (2) in other cases, precluding negotiations over certain 
terms and conditions of employment. 
The unions in B.C. Health Services certainly did not want a bare 
freedom, unhindered and unassisted by the state, to bargain and conclude 
agreements collectively. They wanted the rest of the state-imposed 
collective bargaining regime as well, including, most particularly, the 
exclusive representation provisions, the ability to compel an employer to 
bargain with them and the remedies and sanctions prescribed for default 
or a failure of negotiations. 
In the writer’s respectful view, one cannot take from the fact that the 
B.C. statutory regime includes a measure of “freedom to negotiate” 
between certified bargaining agent and employer that this “freedom” is a 
constitutionally protected freedom, whether under section 2(d) or 
otherwise. The correlative statutory rights of bargaining agent and 
employer established by the typical North American labour relations 
model can equally be seen to be prescriptive rather than permissive in 
nature: it is not that the freedom to bargain is protected, but rather that a 
duty to bargain is imposed. The regime, therefore, cannot be conceived 
of as an instantiation of a fundamental freedom. Rather, it is a labour 
code that reflects complex industrial relations, economic and social 
policy choices.33 
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Voluntary, freely formed associations play a role in the statutory 
scheme only in the sense that trade unions (which are typically voluntary, 
non-statutory associations) can organize workers in a bargaining unit and 
then obtain statutory certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for that 
bargaining unit if supported by majority vote of the workers in the 
bargaining unit. But in their statutory role they are engaged in a highly 
regulated activity that has no resemblance to the exercise of a freedom. 
What happened over the course of time in the last century is that, like other 
voluntary private associations such as law societies in the 19th century, 
trade unions acquired a statutory role. That trade unions enjoy and exercise 
freedom of association qua voluntary associations does not mean that the 
statutory role that they also play is itself an exercise of that freedom. 
This writer submits that the relevant association for an analysis of 
the freedom under section 2(d) is that represented by the voluntary 
coming together of individuals. The fact that freely formed associations 
can acquire a role as bargaining agents by statute does not mean that the 
bargaining unit — the very group of workers for whom collective 
bargaining is undertaken — is itself a freely formed association. Qua 
exclusive bargaining agent a trade union does not represent the coming 
together or association of workers under section 2(d). The typical labour 
statute does not provide for “freedom of association” for the bargaining 
unit. While it is true that a majority vote of the bargaining unit members 
generally determines whether a given trade union is certified as 
bargaining agent, the composition of the bargaining unit is not 
determined by free choice. In the typical North American model, the 
bargaining unit is workplace based — i.e., statutorily confined to a 
category of workers at a given employer’s workplace. Garment-workers 
in a province can voluntarily band together to form a garment-worker’s 
union, and the union can federate with other unions, or sub-divide into 
smaller entities, as the membership may freely choose, all without state 
interference. Yet a bargaining unit of garment-workers at one employer 
cannot decide to merge with another unit of garment-workers at some 
other employer, or with some or all garment-workers city- or province-
wide. Similarly, it is not left to the unfettered choice of workers in a 
bargaining unit whether they wish to sub-divide the unit in a manner that 
reflects their preferences or interests. That matter is often left to labour 
boards to determine in accordance with labour policy criteria that serve 
many more goals than are reflected in the free choice of a class or sub-
class of employees. Indeed, it is frequently the case that a specialized 
sub-class of employees with greater relative bargaining power would 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) REVOLUTION AND AFTERMATH 179 
prefer not to be associated with other employees in their bargaining unit. 
There may be labour policy reasons to leave them in despite their 
wishes, because, for example, the fragmentation of the bargaining unit 
would reduce the bargaining leverage of the less-skilled workers.34 
Further, bargaining unit members cannot choose to leave a bargaining 
unit (except by quitting their employment) nor can they choose not to be 
represented by the certified bargaining agent, unless they secure, through 
a statutorily prescribed process, the decertification of the bargaining 
agent: this typically depends on obtaining a majority vote of bargaining 
unit members, and is an option available only periodically.35 
In summary, in the typical statutory labour relations model, 
bargaining unit members’ freedom to negotiate employment terms, 
whether individually or in collectivities of their own choosing and 
design, is replaced with a system by which the terms and conditions of 
employment are fixed by negotiation between the employer and a 
statutorily empowered bargaining agent. In the statutory model, the 
bargaining unit membership is afforded a measure of choice — whether 
to join or support a trade union that seeks certification as bargaining 
agent, whether to support decertification of the bargaining agent, 
whether to support a collective agreement that has been reached between 
bargaining agent and the employer, whether to strike. But those choices 
are highly regulated and circumscribed by the legislation, and all the 
choices of individuals and dissenting groups are subordinated to the will 
of the majority. This is said to be in the best interests of the collectivity 
of employees as a whole, as it is intended to improve their over-all 
bargaining power, and if that in turn improves bargaining outcomes for 
the collectivity, this is said to improve their overall welfare. Paul Weiler 
put it thus: 
Only if the employees can be welded into a single cohesive group 
presenting a unified format to the employer can they exercise sufficient 
countervailing power to influence significantly their overall terms of 
employment.36  
Some may claim that the prescriptive or compulsory elements of the 
statutory scheme — its subordination of free choice to other goals — are 
themselves in the service of some wider concept of “freedom of 
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association”. The evidence of expert witnesses called in support of a 
constitutional challenge to the exclusion of principals and vice-principals 
from a teachers’ bargaining unit ran along these lines.37 The witnesses 
were of the view that membership of the principals and vice-principals in 
the teachers’ unit should be compulsory because it served the freedom of 
association of teachers as a whole. Moreover, in contrast to mandatory 
membership, it was freedom of choice that was truly “coercive”: 
Witness 1: 
Q. Do you think that by making principals and vice-principals who 
would rather not be part of the federation, by making them be 
members of the federation, that it enhances their ability to 
provide collegial leadership? 
A. Yes, whether they like it or not it does. 
Q. It’s good for them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is because the teachers perceive them to have the same values 
even though they may not? 
A. Yes. 
Witness 2: 
Q. So your position is that mandatory membership gives principals 
choice but voluntary membership doesn’t give them choice? 
A. Yes. 
..... 
Q. What if we abolish statutory membership in the Ontario 
Teachers’ Federation altogether and we just said everybody, 
teacher, principal, join it or don’t join it as you choose, what 
would you think of that as a policy? 
A. I would find that very coercive. 
Unlike these witnesses, among others, this writer confesses skepticism 
about an approach to freedom and choice that interprets the prescriptive or 
compulsory elements of a statutory regime as the instantiation of freedom. 
Whether or not the statute legitimately furthers valid policy objectives, it is 
a fundamental error in principle to say that its prescriptive elements in fact 
foster freedom. We are better to acknowledge plainly that sometimes we 
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legitimately subordinate free choice (whether it be individual or collective 
choice, and whether it be constitutionally protected in a given context or 
not) to policies pursued for broader ends. It is a disservice to legal 
reasoning, not to mention reason in general, to do otherwise.  
Notwithstanding Rousseauean notions of being “forced to be free” 
and Marxist ideas of “false consciousness”, this writer suggests that 
Isaiah Berlin held the preferable view on this issue: 
[N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring 
inequality, or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of 
my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely; but it is freedom that I 
am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow 
men. … [A] sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, 
namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation 
for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness 
or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. … [I]t 
is a confusion of values to say that although my ‘liberal’, individual 
freedom may go by the board, some other kind of freedom — ‘social’ 
or ‘economic’ — is increased.38 
2. The Claim for “Meaningful” Protection 
Returning now to the claimants in B.C. Health Services, having 
presented their claims as claims to freedom from state interference, they 
proceeded to argue that the collective aspect of free collective bargaining 
attracts the protection of section 2(d) on the basis that bargaining and 
concluding enforceable collective agreements is one of the main objects 
— in fact the foundational object — of their associations. They asserted 
that constitutionally guaranteeing their freedom to bargain collectively 
was the only way to ensure that their freedom of association was 
“meaningful”. The legislature’s interference in, and in some cases 
preclusion of, collective bargaining, the unions claimed, rendered their 
very associations pointless or “meaningless”.  
“Meaningful” was the word chosen by the Court in Dunmore to 
explain the extent to which the legislature had to go to protect the 
organizing rights of farm workers in the face of a proven inability to 
organize without statutory assistance.39 The adoption of a posture of 
restraint on the part of the legislature meant, according to the Court, that 
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the workers’ freedom to organize — and hence their freedom of 
association — was not “meaningful”. The Court stated the question as 
follows:   
In this context, it must be asked whether, in order to make the freedom 
to organize meaningful, s. 2(d) of the Charter imposes a positive 
obligation on the state to extend protective legislation to unprotected 
groups.40 
It made the following factual finding: 
… the evidentiary burden has been met in this case: the appellants have 
brought this litigation because there is no possibility for association as 
such without minimum statutory protection.41 
And it granted a remedy in the following language: 
… at minimum the statutory freedom to organize in s. 5 of the LRA 
ought to be extended to agricultural workers, along with protections 
judged essential to its meaningful exercise, such as freedom to 
assemble, to participate in the lawful activities of the association and to 
make representations, and the right to be free from interference, 
coercion and discrimination in the exercise of these freedoms.42  
As noted above, up to and including Dunmore, the Court remained 
committed to distinguishing between an association and its objects. The 
use by the Court of the word “meaningful” to describe a minimum 
constitutional standard of associational ability that, in the context at issue 
in Dunmore, required statutory support, does not imply that the objects 
of an association gain constitutional protection on the ground that the 
failure to protect the objects means that the association’s freedom is not 
“meaningful”. 
The complaint in B.C. Health Services that the unions’ objective of 
collective bargaining was interfered with, and therefore their freedom of 
association was rendered “meaningless”, misinterprets Dunmore’s 
protection of “meaningful freedom of association” as a guarantee of a 
“freedom of meaningful association”, i.e., a guarantee of the essential 
objects of an association. Dunmore’s use of the word “meaningful” in the 
context of its discussion of section 2(d) consistently emphasizes the 
importance of making the freedom guaranteed by section 2(d) meaningful. 
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Section 2(d) does not guarantee that associations themselves will be 
meaningful by guaranteeing their objects. 
3. Special Status versus Neutrality 
As clearly recognized in the Court’s earlier section 2(d) 
jurisprudence, the extension of section 2(d) protection to the objects of 
an association, would be tantamount to a general constitutional 
guarantee of the liberty to pursue any object, provided it was pursued in 
concert.43 Guaranteeing the foundational or essential objects of an 
association, or its raison d’être, would have the same result, since 
bringing a given activity within the scope of section 2(d)’s protection 
would be a matter of limiting the association’s objects to the activity in 
question. This would also require the section 1 justification of any 
limitation or regulation of an activity that could be pursued in concert.  
To read into section 2(d) a guarantee of collective bargaining 
because it is a main object of a trade union would mean that the main 
object of any association would have to be recognized by section 2(d), 
unless, for some reason, a trade union should receive special status, 
within section 2(d), entitling it to the protection of its objects even 
though the objects of other associations are not so entitled. Prior to B.C. 
Health Services the Court had repeatedly stressed that section 2(d) 
should be interpreted in a manner that is mindful of its potentially broad 
application.44  
A neutral approach to section 2(d), one that does not privilege some 
kinds of associations, such as trade unions, over other kinds of 
associations, has its virtues. Giving the judiciary the role of deciding 
which associations are worthy of having their objects and activities 
protected, and which are not, is really just asking the judiciary to select 
among a range of objects and activities as meriting constitutional 
protection, under the rubric of protecting freedom of association. It also 
moves the locus of decision-making over which associations’ activities 
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are worthy, and which unworthy, from the legislatures to the judiciary. It 
is hard to discern in section 2(d) an intention to license the judiciary to 
substitute its value judgments for the legislature’s in relation to the 
worthiness of different associations and/or their objects. One would have 
thought that the purpose of section 2(d) was to protect associating 
generally from these kinds of value judgments, whether they be made by 
the legislature, the executive or the judiciary. 
The neutral approach is the one taken to the other section 2 rights, 
notably section 2(a)’s protection of freedom of religion and section 
2(b)’s protection of freedom of expression. When considering the scope 
of section 2(a) or (b) the Court does not adjudicate the value of a religion 
or its tenets, or the value or content of a given exercise of freedom of 
expression. Section 2(a) and (b) contain no judicially created hierarchy 
of religions or speech. Rather religion and speech enjoy a categorical and 
abstract scope of protection under section 2 of the Charter. The question 
of whether the freedom to engage in a given religious practice or to 
engage in certain speech should yield to the public interest in a 
particular context is addressed in section 1, when the state seeks to 
justify specific legislative limits on the particular religious practice or 
speech.45 Section 1 allows for the kind of context-specific, evidence-
based inquiry (where the burden of justification is on the state) that is 
appropriate to assessing whether a broad freedom ought to yield to the 
public interest in a particular situation. 
Applied to section 2(d), the neutral approach, as the earlier 
jurisprudence recognized, restricts itself to the protection of associating 
itself, not the objects pursued in association. This, the writer submits, 
enables section 2(d) to have a broad and liberal scope. 
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VIII. THE MAKING OF THE REVOLUTION: HOW THE COURT DEALT 
WITH THE CLAIMS IN B.C. HEALTH SERVICES 
At the hearing of the appeal in B.C. Health Services in February 
2006 the seven members of the Supreme Court who sat gave no 
indication of the dramatic change that was in the offing. In fact, 
Bastarache J., the author of the Dunmore majority opinion, specifically 
rejected the suggestion made to the Court by union counsel that 
Dunmore opened the door to Charter protection of collective bargaining: 
the Court, he retorted, would have to go “well beyond” Dunmore for the 
claim to be accepted. Conversely, it was also obvious that certain 
members of the Court were singularly unimpressed with the B.C. 
legislation before them.  
The parties had to wait 16 months for a decision. 
The decision that came in June 2008 shattered the previously 
accepted understanding of section 2(d). The conceptual architecture of 
the Court’s section 2(d) jurisprudence laid down from 1987’s Alberta 
Reference through to and including Dunmore seemed to be swept away, 
with no coherent theory of section 2(d) to replace it. It seemed to be a 
revolution without a program. 
The Court identified what it called a “procedural right collective 
bargaining”, also referred to several times as a “collective right to good faith 
negotiation and consultation”, and, based on four disparate “propositions”, 
granted that right constitutional protection under section 2(d). 
1. Rejection of the Earlier Jurisprudence 
At the outset, as the “first proposition”, the Court dismantled the 
foundations for its earlier jurisprudence that had rejected section 2(d) 
protection for collective bargaining. Most significantly, the Court 
attacked the validity of what this writer has described above as the 
neutral approach to section 2(d) rights. The Court claimed that that the 
“overarching” problem with the earlier jurisprudence, particularly the 
Alberta Reference and the Professional Institute case, was that they took 
a “decontextualized” or “generic” approach to freedom of association, 
which treated all associations as having the same associational rights. 
This was said to be inconsistent with the purposive approach to Charter 
rights: 
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… the majority judgments in the Alberta Reference and PIPSC [the 
Professional Institute case] adopted a decontextualized approach to 
defining the scope of freedom of association, in contrast to the 
purposive approach taken to other Charter guarantees. The result was 
to forestall inquiry into the purpose of that Charter guarantee. The 
generic approach of the earlier decisions to s. 2(d) ignored differences 
between organizations. Whatever the organization — be it trade union 
or book club — its freedoms were treated as identical.46 
The Court did not elaborate on why the approach taken in the Alberta 
Reference and subsequent cases was not “purposive” in the sense that it 
sought to ground the interpretation of section 2(d) in the purposes and 
values underlying the right. A review of the early section 2(d) 
jurisprudence shows considerable judicial attention being paid by both the 
majority judges and dissenters to an examination of what values were 
sought to be reflected in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
association.47 Whatever one’s quarrels with the conclusions reached by the 
justices in the early cases, it cannot seriously be contended that their 
approach was not purposive. As pointed out above, the “decontextualized”, 
or neutral, approach, in refraining from privileging certain associations and 
their activities over others, bears considerable similarity to the approach 
taken to section 2(a) and (b). 
The main point made by the Court in B.C. Health Services to 
demonstrate that the early jurisprudence was not “purposive” was to say 
that all associations were treated as having identical rights under 
freedom of association, and as a result the “unfortunate effect was to 
overlook the importance of collective bargaining — both historically and 
currently — to the exercise of freedom of association in labour 
relations”.48 What this seems to be saying is that the relevant purposive 
inquiry is to inquire into the purpose of a given activity to see if it merits 
constitutional protection, not to inquire into the purposes and values 
underlying the constitutional guarantee to determine its meaning and 
scope. If this is indeed what the Court is saying, it seems that the Court 
has moved more towards the role of constitutional legislator (at least 
with respect to section 2(d)), assessing whether as a matter of 
constitutional policy a given activity merits constitutional protection 
under section 2(d), rather than constitutional interpreter seeking to 
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discern, though a purposive and contextual analysis, the meaning and 
scope of section 2(d). 
This presents the very danger, discussed above, that departing from a 
neutral approach to freedom of association simply lets the judiciary 
decide, using context-dependent criteria developed case by case, which 
activities, when pursued in association, merit constitutional protection 
and which do not. This is not as drastic an outcome (feared by both 
majority and dissent in the Alberta Reference) as automatically 
extending section 2(d) protection to activities merely because they are 
pursued in association, but it nonetheless invites questions about the 
legitimacy of the judiciary’s role in undertaking such a task. 
One clear consequence of the approach adopted in B.C. Health 
Services is to sanction the “balkanization” of the section 2(d) 
jurisprudence in a way that has not occurred with the other section 2 
freedoms. The extent of freedom of association to be accorded to 
different organizations will vary, in accordance with an analysis of 
context and the application of criteria developed by the Court case by 
case. Another consequence is considerable legal uncertainty for the 
foreseeable future, as different types of associations bring claims for 
section 2(d) protection that can only be assessed by reference to the 
particular context and criteria deemed relevant at the time. 
The Court explicitly acknowledged the concern found in the earlier 
jurisprudence that section 2(d) was not intended to automatically protect 
the innumerably varied activities that might be pursued in association: 
“the underlying concern — that the Charter not be used to protect the 
substantive outcomes of any and all associations — is a valid one”.49 
This concern, the Court stated, had given rise to the stance (notably 
consistent in the jurisprudence from the Alberta Reference through to 
and including Dunmore) that section 2(d) does not protect the objects of 
an association, necessitating that a distinction be drawn between “the 
associational aspect of the activity”, which is protected, and “the activity 
itself”, which is not. 
Yet the Court also explicitly rejected the idea that the distinction 
between the associational aspect of an activity and the activity itself can 
in fact be drawn:  
… it will always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular 
activity in concert with others as the “object” of that association. 
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Recasting collective bargaining as an “object” begs the question of 
whether or not the activity is worthy of constitutional protection.50 
Thus, it seems that the problem the Court sees as a legitimate 
concern is the risk of extending constitutional protection to all activities 
pursued by all associations, and not the idea, expressed repeatedly in the 
earlier jurisprudence, that the purpose of section 2(d) is to protect 
associating itself, i.e., the coming together in pursuit of common goals, 
not the goals that may be pursued by way of coming together. But if the 
purpose of section 2(d) is not to protect just associating itself, as opposed 
to the myriad of ends achievable by associating, then what is its 
purpose? The Court seems to offer no answer.  
Despite the Court’s apparent confidence in disposing of the 
distinction between an association and its objects, it was impelled to 
draw a distinction between the “process” of collective bargaining and its 
“outcomes”: 
… “collective bargaining” as a procedure has always been 
distinguishable from its final outcomes (e.g., the results of the 
bargaining process, which may be reflected in a collective agreement).  
… In our view, it is entirely possible to protect the “procedure” known 
as collective bargaining without mandating constitutional protection 
for the fruits of that bargaining process. Thus, the characterization of 
collective bargaining as an association’s “object” does not provide a 
principled reason to deny it constitutional protection.51 
This distinction, between the process and outcomes of collective 
bargaining is new to section 2(d) (and section 2 in general),52 and really 
does not answer in a meaningful way the concern that section 2(d) is 
intended to protect the associational aspect of an activity as opposed to 
the activity itself. The distinction seems to be aimed at separating 
associational means (the process of collective bargaining — protected by 
section 2(d)) from associational ends (collective agreements — not 
protected by section 2(d)). Yet, to return to the example of the gun club, 
pooling resources for the purchase of firearms is clearly only the means 
or “process”, pursued associationally, by which the club seeks to achieve 
its goal of gun possession, ownership and use. And, of course, gun 
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possession, ownership and use could either be ends in themselves, or 
merely the means to further ends, such as self-defence or enjoyment of 
the sport of marksmanship. The distinction, therefore, between process 
or means, on the one hand, and outcomes or ends, on the other hand, 
does no work to meet the challenge of establishing an appropriate scope 
for the section 2(d) right. 
Curiously, though, later in the judgment a great deal of reliance 
seems to be placed by the Court on the process/outcome distinction in 
the collective bargaining context. This will be discussed further below. 
The Court also rejected the earlier jurisprudence on a number of 
other grounds. It noted that, as held in Dunmore, the individual analogue 
test for a section 2(d) infringement was not sound. This issue has been 
discussed at some length above.  
The Court also stated that the early cases wrongly advocated an 
approach that was too deferential of government in labour relations 
matters. Yet little was offered in the judgment to address the very 
extensive reasoning in the earlier cases in favour of judicial restraint in 
the policy-laden and highly political arena of labour relations regulation. 
For example, in the Alberta Reference, McIntyre J. stressed the grave 
difficulties that would face the judiciary in conducting a section 1 review 
of the legislature’s myriad of labour relations policy choices if a 
constitutional right to collective bargaining (or its incidents, such as the 
right to strike), were to be included in section 2(d):  
… There is clearly no correct balance which may be struck giving 
permanent satisfaction to the two groups, as well as securing the public 
interest. The whole process is inherently dynamic and unstable. Care 
must be taken then in considering whether constitutional protection 
should be given to one aspect of this dynamic and evolving process 
while leaving the others subject to the social pressures of the day. 
..... 
If collective bargaining were constitutionalized under section 
2(d), my worry is that judges might be flooded with 
arguments from litigants who are unhappy with the current tilt 
in the balance of power between unions, employers, and 
individual employees in collective bargaining legislation. 
These litigants will challenge a particular aspect of collective 
bargaining law, citing vague arguments of democratic, 
associational, economic, or political rights that will only serve 
to confuse the judge. Other parties whose interests will be 
affected by the decision may not receive intervenor status or 
190 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
may not even be aware of the case. It is unlikely that the 
necessary evidential base to decide the policy issue will be 
provided. When we consider that collective bargaining law is 
polycentric in nature, adjustments to the delicate industrial 
relations balance in one part of the system might have 
unanticipated and unfortunate effects in another. 
The lessons of the evolution of our labour law regime in the 
past 50 years display very clearly that the legislatures are far 
better equipped than the courts to strike the appropriate 
balance between the interests of the individual employee, the 
union, the employer and the public. … The courtroom is not 
the place to be developing collective bargaining policy. 
… The section 1 inquiry involves the reconsideration by a court of the 
balance struck by the Legislature in the development of labour policy. 
… There are no clearly correct answers to these questions. They are of 
a nature peculiarly apposite to the functions of the Legislature. 53 
The institutional inappropriateness of having the judiciary rebalance 
labour relations policy in the context of a section 1 analysis remains as 
much a concern today as it did when that case was decided, and has been 
reflected in the Court’s labour jurisprudence ever since.54 In a passage 
reminiscent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in 
Lochner v. New York,55 the Court in Dunmore echoed the need for 
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significant judicial deference in the assessment of legislative choices in 
the field of labour relations policy: 
[T]o exclude a given occupation from the LRA “involves a weighing of 
complex values and policy considerations that are often difficult to 
balance” and … this balancing “will in large part depend upon the 
particular perspective, priorities, views, and assumptions of the policy 
makers, as well as the political and economic theory to which they 
subscribe”. Similar statements have been made about labour relations 
generally, which have been described as “an extremely sensitive 
subject” premised on “a political and economic compromise between 
organized labour — a very powerful socio-economic force — on the 
one hand and the employers of labour — an equally powerful socio-
economic force — on the other (Alberta Reference, supra, per 
McIntyre J., at p. 414). Policy choices are based on value judgments. 
This Court will only interfere with such choices where a more 
fundamental value is at stake and where it is apparent that a free and 
democratic society cannot permit the policy to interfere with the right 
in the circumstances of the case.56  
Instead of confronting the justifications advanced in this jurisprudence, 
the Court in B.C. Health Services simply declared that judicial restraint had 
been carried too far.57 The baldness of the Court’s claim offers no answer to 
the legitimate concern that section 1 of the Charter, in particular, is not a fit 
tool to enable the courts to undertake the task of balancing the multifaceted 
policy concerns involved in government regulation of labour relations.   
Most significantly, the Court rejected the earlier jurisprudence’s 
understanding of collective bargaining in its modern incarnation as not a 
“fundamental freedom” but rather a statutory right that is but one strand 
in the fabric of a prescriptive labour relations regime. In the view of the 
Court in B.C. Health Services the modern statutory form of collective 
bargaining does not prevent collective bargaining from meriting 
constitutional status: 
… the fundamental importance of collective bargaining to labour 
relations was the very reason for its incorporation into statute. 
Legislatures throughout Canada have historically viewed collective 
bargaining rights as sufficiently important to immunize them from 
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potential interference. The statutes they passed did not create the right 
to bargain collectively. Rather, they afforded it protection. There is 
nothing in the statutory entrenchment of collective bargaining that 
detracts from its fundamental nature.58 
Notably, this passage stresses the “fundamental” nature of collective 
bargaining, without attempting to describe it as a freedom. Nor is there 
any acknowledgment, either here or in the Court’s later examination of 
Canadian labour history,59 of the relevant distinctions that might exist 
between pre-statutory collective bargaining, undertaken freely by 
workers in association,60 on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
statutory collective bargaining which operates by way of a prescriptive 
regime mandating exclusivity and the duty to bargain, as discussed at 
length above. Herein lies the root problem of the B.C. Health Services 
decision.  
After dismantling the earlier jurisprudence, the Court proceeded to 
outline three remaining “propositions” which it said support a finding 
that collective bargaining — specifically a “procedural right to collective 
bargaining” — is protected by section 2(d). The propositions are, first, 
that the history of collective bargaining shows its fundamental nature, 
second, that international instruments protect collective bargaining and 
third, that collective bargaining furthers certain values that find 
expression in other parts of the Charter. 
Consistent, it seems, with the “contextualized” approach, none of 
these three propositions are statements about the nature of section 2(d); 
rather they are observations about collective bargaining. The Court does 
not attempt to replace the principles it rejected with any theory of section 
2(d)’s nature or scope. It is in fact, somewhat unclear which, if any, of 
the principles of the previous jurisprudence remain valid. It may be that 
all of the earlier section 2(d) claims in all contexts are subject to being 
revisited under the new contextualized approach.  
As will be seen, however, the contextualized approach and its 
application in the B.C. Health Services case offers very little guidance as 
to how section 2(d) claims should be handled in the future. Neither the 
three propositions deployed in B.C. Health Services to support section 
2(d) extension to collective bargaining, nor the contextualized approach 
                                                                                                             
58
 Id., at para. 25. 
59
 Id., at paras. 40-68. 
60
 Accompanied by other non-statutory measures such as recognition strikes intended to 
induce employers to bargain. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) REVOLUTION AND AFTERMATH 193 
itself, offer assistance in predicting whether a given activity of a given 
association will receive section 2(d) protection. In fact, it is submitted, 
the three propositions and the contextual approach seem to be largely 
devoid of normative force. It is unclear why the propositions, taken 
together, lead to the conclusion that collective bargaining ought to 
receive section 2(d) protection. 
2. Labour History 
The Court’s proposition that the history of collective bargaining and 
its treatment in Canadian law before the Charter show its fundamental 
importance is supported by a lengthy dissertation on labour history.61 
The accuracy of the Court’s treatment of this history is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, it is in elaborating this history that the Court 
introduces the fundamental misconception in its judgment: that the 
collective bargaining right in its modern form can be likened to a 
fundamental freedom. The Court asserts that collective bargaining long 
pre-dates its statutory incarnation. That is undoubtedly true: in fact, it is 
likely that workers exercised freedom to come together in groups, or 
trade guilds, or associations, to bargain for better terms or working 
conditions for as long as humans have been bargaining. But this offers 
no reason to regard the collective bargaining features of the modern 
statutory regime as the same species of activity.  
The Court points out that the long history and importance of 
collective bargaining was the reason that legislatures enacted collective 
bargaining statutes, thus creating the modern collective bargaining 
regime: 
… As society entered into the industrialized era, “workers began to 
join unions and to engage in collective bargaining with their 
employers. Although employers resisted this development with all the 
resources at their command, it eventually became apparent that unions 
and collective bargaining were natural concomitants of a mixed 
enterprise economy. The state then assumed the task of establishing a 
framework of rights and responsibilities within which management and 
organized labour were to conduct their relations.”62 
While this may explain why collective bargaining statutes themselves 
are important to “a mixed enterprise economy”, it does not offer a reason 
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why constitutional protection for collective bargaining is required in 
addition to the incorporation of collective bargaining features in the 
modern statutes. There is no real explanation here of a normative or policy 
rationale to bring collective bargaining within constitutional as opposed to 
statutory protection.  
All the while, the Court fails to acknowledge that with the enactment 
of collective bargaining regimes, collective bargaining was transformed 
from an activity with a voluntary associational aspect into something 
with a compulsory character. It remained associational, but the relevant 
association for purposes of statutory collective bargaining — the 
bargaining unit — was not itself a free association; and the activity of 
statutory collective bargaining became in fact compulsory for both 
bargaining agents and employers.  
The Court’s quotation from Professors Fudge and Glasbeek’s 
description of the transformation wrought to collective bargaining by its 
statutory incorporation is telling, once emphasis is added to the relevant 
words: 
For the first time in Canada’s history, the government compelled 
employers to recognize and to bargain with duly elected 
representatives and/or trade unions. From the workers’ perspective, 
this constituted a movement from having a right to state their interest 
in being represented by a union to having enforceable legal right to 
have their chosen representative treated as a union by their employer. 
There was no longer any need to use collective economic muscle — 
always seriously limited by the common law — to obtain the right to 
bargain collectively with employers.63  
The picture is completed when it is also noted that the trade unions 
themselves are compelled to bargain collectively under the statute, not 
merely for their own members, but also for those workers who, as 
Professor Weiler put it, “belong to other unions and even those who 
want nothing to do with any union”.64  
To be fair, the Court does not remain completely silent in response 
to the B.C. government’s argument that modern collective bargaining is 
a statutory right: 
The respondent argues that the right to collective bargaining is of 
recent origin and is merely a creature of statute. This assertion may be 
true if collective bargaining is equated solely to the framework of 
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rights of representation and collective bargaining now recognized 
under federal and provincial labour codes. However, the origin of a 
right to collective bargaining in the sense given to it in the present case 
(i.e., a procedural right to bargain collectively on conditions of 
employment), precedes the adoption of the present system of labour 
relations in the 1940s.65 
This passage suggests that the Court does acknowledge that there is a 
material difference between non-statutory collective bargaining and the 
inclusion of collective bargaining in modern labour statutes. But what 
the Court fails to acknowledge is that the essential difference between 
the statutory and pre-statutory forms of collective bargaining is the 
introduction of compulsion to replace voluntariness, and that this is 
fundamental to the consideration of whether collective bargaining in its 
modern form is constitutionally protected as a freedom. 
One may be led to conclude from this passage that the Court is not 
purporting to constitutionalize the modern form of collective bargaining, 
but only its voluntary, pre-statutory progenitor. This possibility is belied 
by the Court’s insistence, later in the judgment, that the constitutional 
right to collective bargaining implies a corresponding duty to bargain on 
the part of the employer66 — a duty foreign to any non-statutory, 
voluntary model of collective bargaining. It is also belied by the 
outcome in the case, namely the invalidation of legislation that sought to 
interfere with the product and scope of statutory collective bargaining. 
As part of its recitation of history, the Court discusses the comments 
on collective bargaining of the Acting Minister of Justice before the 
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons that was 
formed to consider the draft constitutional resolution at the federal level. 
The Court does not note that the comments were made in opposition to a 
motion to amend the draft text of section 2(d) to read “freedom of 
association including the freedom to organize and collective bargaining”, 
which was defeated 20-2.67 The defeat of the motion suggests a 
legislative intention to exclude rather than include the claimed right, 
assuming that the intentions of a federal legislative committee are even 
relevant when considering an instrument that was the product of 
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negotiations among multiple governments and enacted by the Parliament 
at Westminster, not Ottawa. 
The Acting Minister’s comments are quoted by the Court as follows: 
Our position on the suggestion that there be specific reference to 
freedom to organize and bargain collectively is that that is already 
covered in the freedom of association that is provided already in the 
Declaration or in the Charter; and that by singling out association for 
bargaining one might tend to d[i]minish all the other forms of 
association which are contemplated — church associations; associations 
of fraternal organizations or community organizations.68 
In the writer’s view, the Acting Minister’s comments do not disclose an 
understanding that the modern form of collective bargaining (with its 
compulsory features including the duty to bargain) is intended to be 
included in freedom of association. Rather, it suggests something much 
less than that, for the comments clearly explain that other associations, 
such as religious, fraternal and community organizations, should not be 
“diminished” relative to trade unions in regard to the protections offered 
by section 2(d). Yet it can hardly be contemplated that the objects of 
religious organizations, such as, for example, the conversion of non-
adherents, were intended to receive section 2(d) protection. The 
interpretation of the Acting Minister’s comments that makes sense of 
them as a whole is that freedom of association would protect the 
freedom to organize (which it clearly does) and to collectively bargain, 
should it ever come to pass that a legislature was minded to introduce the 
kinds of legal disabilities on union organizing and voluntary collective 
bargaining that characterized the 19th century. The writer ventures to 
add that the Acting Minister would never have assented to the theses that 
a “procedural right to collective bargaining” enshrined in the Charter 
would mean that the state could not by legislation set aside the terms of a 
negotiated collective agreement. Yet that was the outcome of the B.C. 
Health Services case.  
Regardless of the details of labour and legislative history, an 
important question arises as to the significance of this historical factor 
for future cases involving section 2(d) rights. The kind of prominence 
that collective bargaining has in the historical record recited by the 
Supreme Court may or may not be shared by other associational 
activities for which section 2(d) protection is sought. A given activity’s 
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(or association’s) place in the pre-Charter historical record is an entirely 
contingent matter. Some kinds of associations may be able to point to a 
long and important history; others perhaps not. It is unclear whether the 
emphasis placed on history in B.C. Health Services disentitles an 
associational activity from consideration for section 2(d) protection if it 
lacks the requisite pedigree. If that is the case, then section 2(d) would 
be plagued by the “frozen concepts” approach that undermined the 
efficacy of the federal Bill of Rights69 in the 20 years leading up to the 
Charter. This also raises the question as to whether the contingencies of 
history should be relevant at all to what should be a normative inquiry on 
whether constitutional protection extends to a given associational 
activity. 
3. International Law 
The Court’s next “proposition” supporting the inclusion of collective 
bargaining in section 2(d) is the existence of international instruments 
dealing with labour rights. The accuracy of the Court’s treatment of 
international labour law is a matter for others to examine.70 
What cannot go without comment, however, is the Court’s adoption of 
Dickson C.J.C.’s statement in the Alberta Reference that, “the Charter 
should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is 
found in the international human rights documents that Canada has 
ratified”.71 This proposition represents a dramatic shift from the 
conventional understanding that the federal government’s execution on 
behalf of Canada of an international instrument represents at its highest a 
commitment to enact such domestic legislation as may be required to give 
effect to the international instrument. (It certainly does not create 
enforceable domestic law.72) Because an international human rights 
obligation can be, and generally is intended to be, fully implemented 
simply by the enactment of domestic legislation, it should not be the case 
that an international law obligation can give rise to a presumption of 
incorporation in the domestic constitution. Further, the government is 
usually at liberty to withdraw from an international instrument in 
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accordance with prescribed terms. It would be odd if shifting international 
commitments altered the content of the Canadian Constitution.  
It is also necessary to observe that there will be a strong disincentive 
for the federal government to agree to new international human rights 
obligations in emerging or hitherto neglected fields if to do so creates a 
presumption of constitutional interpretation that the obligations are also 
contained in the Charter.73 Conversely, a federal government with an 
agenda that seeks to further the constitutionalization of a controversial 
right or interest (e.g., a right to bear arms, property rights, or the absolute 
right to an abortion) could very well enter into a treaty on the subject 
with similarly minded foreign governments in the hope of creating a 
presumption of Charter protection. 
In addition, there are problems faced by the provinces in this regard. 
The provinces may or may not be consulted with respect to the federal 
government’s treaty-making plans. It would be odd if the federal 
government’s treaty making could, by operation of the resulting 
constitutional presumption, undermine both Canadian federalism and the 
amending formula in the Constitution. 
Lastly, recourse to international law, like reliance on history, is 
something that is not necessarily available in any given case to show 
whether a given associational activity warrants inclusion in section 2(d). 
Some associational activities may find expression in international law, 
others may not. It is unclear whether Charter protection will depend 
upon finding an “international analogue”. 
4. Charter Values 
The Court’s final proposition in favour of section 2(d) protection for 
collective bargaining is that it furthers certain values reflected elsewhere 
in the Charter. The Court cites the values of democracy, liberty, 
autonomy, dignity and equality. The Court’s recitation of values found 
in other sections of the Charter is particularly interesting given the 
absence, noted above, of any real discussion of how the values 
underlying section 2(d) in particular actually favour the inclusion of 
collective bargaining. 
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In considering Charter values, the Court makes no effort to determine 
whether any Charter values run counter to the inclusion of collective 
bargaining in section 2(d). The values of individual liberty, personal 
autonomy and dignity, reflected in the fundamental freedoms themselves 
and in section 7, would seem to be at best only equivocally served by those 
features of collective bargaining that necessitate the subordination of 
individual choice to the needs and wishes of the collectivity. The 
democratic principles of majoritarianism reflected in collective bargaining 
regimes could be seen to be somewhat at odds with the Charter’s anti-
majoritarian features, particularly its protections for dissenting individuals 
and groups. “Solidarity”, the traditional union value which justifies the 
subordination of the individual to the collectivity, is not itself a discernible 
Charter value. Even the values that the Court has found underlying the 
section 15 equality guarantee — human dignity and the assessment of 
individuals on their actual needs, capacities and circumstances rather than 
presumed and stereotypical group characteristics74 — do not seem to 
accord fully with such typical features of collective bargaining as the 
seniority system.75 
Left undiscussed in the Court’s decision is whether the promotion of 
Charter values is necessary for an activity to merit inclusion in section 2(d). 
If it is, it would seem that a great many organizations and associational 
activities would be excluded from consideration, as they are dedicated to 
values that do not find expression in the Charter. Organizations dedicated 
to or celebrating the values of charity, thrift, productivity, magnanimity, 
humility, sporting prowess or military sacrifice, among others, would not 
seem to be fostering specifically “Charter values”. A neutral analysis would 
focus on the values underlying freedom of association itself, rather than 
attempt to find a match between an association’s values and those in other 
parts of the Charter. 
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5. Conclusion on the Court’s Section 2(d) Analysis of Whether 
Collective Bargaining is Protected 
In the writer’s respectful view, the Court’s section 2(d) analysis in B.C. 
Health Services suffers from an absence of principle and excess of 
context.76 Even if the Court is asserting that it is entitled to make 
constitutional policy without reference to the interpretation or development 
and application of principles of general application, we are left without any 
real articulation of (i) how the policy factors taken into consideration by the 
Court (the three propositions just discussed) are related to the values and 
purposes underlying section 2(d), (ii) why the factors carry the normative 
weight that the Court seems to ascribe to them, (iii) whether they are 
necessary conditions for section 2(d) protection in other contexts, and (iv) 
what other factors, or kinds of factors, could be relevant to section 2(d) 
protection.  
IX. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
1. Process versus Outcome 
After deciding that a procedural right to collective bargaining is 
covered by section 2(d), the Court went on to discuss its characteristics. 
As mentioned above, the Court confined section 2(d) protection to the 
process of collective bargaining as opposed to its outcomes. It also stated 
that the right was general in nature and did not protect a particular model 
of labour relations. 
… the protected activity might be described as employees banding 
together to achieve particular work-related objectives. Section 2(d) 
does not guarantee the particular objectives sought through this 
associational activity. However, it guarantees the process through 
which those goals are pursued. 
..... 
… as the right is to a process, it does not guarantee a certain 
substantive or economic outcome … the right is to a general process of 
collective bargaining, not to a particular model of labour relations, nor 
to a specific bargaining method.77 
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Due to the nature of the Court’s section 2(d) analysis, we do not 
have a ready explanation for the process/outcome distinction. As we 
have seen, the distinction seems to distinguish means from ends, but this 
does not forestall the risk of section 2(d) protecting a wide range of 
associational activities that can be characterized as means to an 
association’s ends. If only the ultimate objective (the substantive 
outcome) is excluded from associational protection, but the intermediate 
ends that are means to the ultimate end do enjoy section 2(d) protection, 
the distinction has not done much work. 
In the writer’s view, the distinction does very little work at all in the 
case of collective bargaining. For it is necessary to consider what the 
distinction is actually excluding from the ambit of section 2(d)’s 
protection in the labour relations context. The Court explains in the 
passage quoted above that what the distinction excludes from protection 
is “a certain substantive or economic outcome”. This is not saying much. 
For it is quite inconceivable how section 2(d) could possibly guarantee a 
particular economic outcome. The notion that freedom of association 
somehow guarantees a particular wage or wage increase is absurd. If so, 
then it is hard to discern what part of collective bargaining has actually 
been excluded from the ambit of section 2(d). It would seem that all of 
collective bargaining is protected, and certainly anything that can be 
characterized as a means or a process. 
There is a further difficulty. The Court’s claim that only process and 
not substance is protected is belied by the actual result in B.C. Health 
Services. On finding that the procedural right to collective bargaining 
had been infringed without justification under section 1, the Court 
invalidated the B.C. legislation that had altered past collective 
bargaining outcomes. In the result, the bargaining outcomes of past 
negotiations were protected from legislative interference. One would 
have thought that in the face of an infringement of the procedural right 
to collective bargaining, the remedy would have been an order that the 
parties comply with the required procedure — namely to go back to the 
bargaining table. What we have instead is a remedy that effectively 
restores the previously achieved bargaining outcome. In a wry comment 
in the Canadian Western Bank case released just a week before B.C. 
Health Services, Binnie J. noted that, “it is wise to look at what the 
courts do as distinguished from what they say”.78 This wisdom suggests 
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that contrary to the claim of a process/outcome distinction, at the very 
least past bargaining outcomes really are protected by section 2(d). 
2. Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
The Court held that the duty to bargain in good faith is part and 
parcel of the procedural right to collective bargaining. The duty rests on 
both the employer and the employees: 
… the state must not substantially interfere with the ability of a union 
to exert meaningful influence over working conditions through a 
process of collective bargaining conducted in accordance with the duty 
to bargain in good faith. Thus the employees’ right to collective 
bargaining imposes corresponding duties on the employer. It requires 
both employer and employees to meet and to bargain in good faith, in 
the pursuit of a common goal of peaceful and productive 
accommodation.79 
This, the writer submits, is indicative that notions of freedom of 
association have been mixed up in B.C. Health Services with the 
modern, statutory form of collective bargaining, in which the parties are 
compelled to negotiate with each other. Constitutional protection appears 
to be extended not to voluntary, free collective bargaining, but rather to a 
compulsory process. In fact, unlike the situation with other section 2 
freedoms, the right-holders do not appear even to have a choice as to 
whether to exercise their right, for they, like their employers, are 
required to bargain. 
Another anomaly here is that a duty to bargain is imposed on 
employers under the fundamental freedom of freedom of association. 
Yet under freedom of speech under section 2(b) there is no duty (even 
upon the government) to listen to speech uttered by the right-holder. 
This is so, even though imposing a constitutional duty to listen would 
certainly make the section 2(b) right more “meaningful”. 
B.C. Health Services addresses only the public sector employer’s 
duty to bargain. It further suggests that private sector employees do not 
enjoy a constitutional right, similar to that of their colleagues in the 
public sector, that compels their private employers to bargain with them. 
The Court states: 
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… The Charter applies only to state action. One form of state action is 
the passage of legislation. In this case, the legislature of British 
Columbia has passed legislation applying to relations between health 
care sector employers and the unions accredited to those employers. 
That legislation must conform to s. 2(d) of the Charter … A second 
form of state action is the situation where the government is an 
employer. While a private employer is not bound by s. 2(d), the 
government as employer must abide by the Charter, under s. 32 …80 
Generally, of course, private employees are covered by the Labour 
Relations Act or its equivalent in other jurisdictions, and those regimes 
impose a statutory duty to bargain upon private employers. There are 
certain classes of employees, such as Ontario farm workers, who are not 
covered by collective bargaining legislation that imposes a duty to 
bargain. It is contended in the farm worker litigation in Ontario81 that the 
legislature is obliged under section 2(d) to enact a collective bargaining 
regime for farm workers that would require private farm employers to 
bargain with the exclusive bargaining agent selected by majority vote at 
the farm workplace. If this contention is accepted it would have the 
effect of requiring the state, pursuant to the Charter guarantee of freedom 
of association, to compel a private employer to deal exclusively with the 
majority-supported employee association, and to refuse to recognize and 
freely bargain with a minority-supported association of workers at that 
workplace. While such a requirement from a labour policy perspective 
may be seen as unremarkable, that it could be mandated by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is astonishing. It 
remains to be seen what the courts will do with this claim in light of B.C. 
Health Services. 
3. Substantial Interference 
The Court, drawing from the Dunmore case, held that only a 
“substantial interference”, by government conduct or legislation, with 
the procedural right to collective bargaining would infringe section 
2(d).82 It is not necessary for the interference to be intentional; 
substantially interfering effects are sufficient.83 The Court elaborated that 
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“[t]o constitute substantial interference with freedom of association, the 
intent or effect must seriously undercut or undermine the activity of 
workers joining together to pursue the common goals of negotiating 
workplace conditions and terms of employment with their employer that 
we call collective bargaining”.84  
Although the Court indicated that each case would be fact specific, 
examples of substantial interference could include: “union breaking” 
legislation, acts of bad faith (presumably in negotiations), and “unilateral 
nullification [through legislation] of negotiated terms, without any 
process of meaningful discussion and consultation”.85  
The last cited example, the voiding of negotiated terms and the 
substitution of legislative terms was what was found to be constitutionally 
offensive in the B.C. Health Services case.86 In addition, the Court held on 
the facts of B.C. Health Services that legislative prescription of terms so as 
to preclude future negotiations was also a breach of section 2(d). This 
covers terms that not only were the subject of negotiations (whether or not 
they made their way into an actual agreement), but also those that could 
have been negotiated.87  
It is hard to overstate implications of this proposition, which 
effectively grants constitutional protection to the content of collective 
agreements, subject only to the state justifying legislative interference 
under section 1 of the Charter. As Robert Charney has noted, it appears 
that the Court has imported into the Charter discredited American 
constitutional notions protecting the inviolability of contracts.88 With 
B.C. Health Services, though, contracts seem to be inviolable only if 
they are collective agreements concluded between trade unions and 
employers. B.C. Health Services goes even further by precluding 
legislative interference with potential collective agreements, not merely 
actual ones.  
What this means is that the hierarchy of laws in this country has 
apparently been turned topsy-turvy: contracts had formerly been treated 
as a source of law for the relations between the parties, and entirely 
subject to democratically enacted statute law and judge-made common 
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law. Now, the species of contract known as the collective agreement has 
been elevated to a status above statute law, subject only, it seems, to 
limits under section 1 of the Charter.89 
The procedural right to collective bargaining seems to indicate that, 
subject perhaps only to section 1, governments are constitutionally 
restricted in effecting change and making law in areas covered by actual 
or potential collective agreements: instead of legislating they must 
negotiate in good faith with trade unions. And, as discussed further 
below, based on the section 1 analysis applied in B.C. Health Services, it 
appears that a failure to negotiate or consult in advance of legislating 
will be fatal to any section 1 justification that might be offered by 
government.90  
The implications of this transformation of the legal order are all the 
more astounding when it is realized that the areas covered by actual or 
potential collective bargaining and collective agreements has grown over 
the last few decades to embrace far more than traditional terms of 
employment.91 Unions, particularly in the public sector, have asserted a 
greater desire to deal in negotiations, under the auspices of addressing 
“working conditions”, with what are not merely of concern to employees 
but are also fundamental issues of public policy. Examples range from 
the provision of weapons to police officers, border officials and even 
transit workers, to the content and delivery of the public school 
curriculum and school testing, to the accommodation of persons with 
disabilities. The operation, closure, relocation or reorganization of public 
facilities, such as hospitals, prisons, universities and electrical generating 
stations, directly implicate the broader public interest, and yet the 
government’s ability to pursue the public interest through legislative or 
regulatory measures is now subject to the vagaries of the collective 
bargaining process.  
For the first time in Canadian history, the permissible ambit of a 
legislative initiative seems to be governed by the past negotiating 
history, and present and future negotiating intentions, of trade unions 
with employers. Consider, for a moment, the position of a government 
policymaker or adviser seeking to develop a legislative initiative to 
address a pressing issue or implement a newly elected government’s 
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platform. In order to determine whether the government can act free of 
constitutional risk — and whether the government can proceed without 
first engaging in good faith negotiations or consultations with trade 
unions to address the issue — the policymaker or adviser must determine 
whether any collective agreement will be affected by the proposed 
legislation. He or she must further consider (how, it is not clear) what the 
confidential negotiating history has been with trade unions on issues that 
could be affected by the legislation. It must also be determined whether 
the legislation might preclude negotiations over some aspect of an area 
that a trade union might possibly want to deal with in future 
negotiations. On the logic of B.C. Health Services this would appear to 
be the case not merely with public sector unions, but also with private 
sector unions and employers. B.C. Health Services states that section 
2(d) not only binds government employers, it also prevents the legislator 
from displacing or precluding collective bargaining, and this presumably 
includes collective bargaining in the private sector.92 The result of this is 
what the writer submits is an intolerable degree of constitutional 
uncertainty with respect to broad swathes of public policy.  
Further, it offers the prospect of the patchwork constitutionality of 
legislation. In the case of some sectors, institutions or companies, there 
will be no history, intention or hope of collectively bargaining a 
particular issue that stands to be affected by a legislative measure. Yet in 
relation to another sector, institution or company, the existence of such a 
history, intention or hope on the part of a trade union will mean that the 
legislative measure would be at constitutional risk on section 2(d) 
grounds. 
With all of this, we are left to wonder how it is that the past or future 
bargaining conduct of certain parties can possibly determine the content 
and application of a constitutional norm.  
Some consideration might also be given to the implications of the 
transformation brought about by B.C. Health Services from the 
perspective of parties engaged in collective bargaining (whether it be in 
the public or private sector). Prior to B.C. Health Services it was 
understood by the parties that legislation governing certain terms and 
conditions (e.g., pension legislation, or occupational health and safety 
rules, or other regulations that affect the workplace) established a frame 
of reference within which negotiations might take place. With B.C. 
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Health Services one wonders whether parties to collective bargaining 
can simply ignore legislated terms affecting terms and conditions of 
employment on the basis that they were enacted unilaterally and thus 
unconstitutionally preclude bargaining the issue. The frame of reference 
for bargaining appears to have been lost. Without it, where does 
bargaining start? What are the ground rules? 
B.C. Health Services offers very little to resolve these quandaries. 
The Court, seemingly in an effort to introduce a limiting principle to the 
scope of the section 2(d) right, averred that “if [a] subject matter is of 
lesser importance to the union, then it is less likely that the section 2(d) 
right to bargain collectively is infringed”.93 Yet the Court’s offer of 
nothing but trivial examples of matters that might be considered of 
“lesser importance” suggests that virtually anything of substance can be 
treated as of sufficient importance to trigger the section 2(d) right:  
… measures affecting less important matters such as the design of 
uniform, the lay out and organization of cafeterias, or the location or 
availability of parking lots, may be far less likely to constitute 
significant interference with the s. 2(d) right of freedom of 
association.94 
When applying the principles it has developed to the legislative 
provisions at issue in B.C. Health Services, the Court seems to be 
inconsistent in its approach to determining whether a legislative 
prescription impermissibly removes a subject matter from the scope of 
potential collective bargaining. For the most part, the Court treats the 
legislative imposition of terms so as to preclude future negotiations over 
those terms as an infringement of section 2(d).95 However, in the case of 
B.C.’s repeal of a job retraining and financial support program for laid 
off employees, the Court held that because the program did not 
originally emerge from a past process of collective bargaining and 
depended on the authority of the government for its existence (rather 
than being within the control of employer and employees), the repeal did 
not offend section 2(d):  
The ESLA did not arise out of collective bargaining but, rather, was 
imposed by the government on health sector employers pursuant to the 
recommendations of an inquiry committee. Since neither the ESLA nor 
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the HLAA was the outcome of a collective bargaining process, 
modifying them cannot constitute an interference with past bargaining 
processes. Further, since the ESLA and HLAA rely heavily on the 
authority of the government for their existence, and are outside of the 
power of health sector employees and employers, there is no potential 
for future collective bargaining over matters relating to either the 
ESLA and HLAA. Since there can be no future collective bargaining 
relating to the ESLA or the HLAA, there can be no interference with 
future collective bargaining over these matters either. It follows that 
neither s. 7 nor s. 8 has the purpose or effect of interfering with 
collective bargaining, past or future.96 
We may take some comfort from the Court’s affirmation that the 
legislative repeal of a program that had its genesis outside collective 
bargaining does not engage section 2(d) right. But it is hard to 
understand how the fact that the legislation was not the subject matter of 
past collective bargaining can be determinative, when its existence may 
very well have been taken into account in past bargaining. The program 
was presumably part of the frame of reference in which bargaining took 
place. 
What this tells us, though, is that the law (particularly statute law) 
must provide the frame of reference for collective bargaining, and that 
collective bargaining must be subordinate to the law, not the other way 
around. 
X. SECTION 1 
In B.C. Health Services the relationship between section 1 and the 
protected collective bargaining right under section 2(d) is not clear. It is 
stated in the exposition of section 2(d) that if the government wishes to 
effect change on matters of importance it should negotiate them in lieu 
of proceeding unilaterally by way of legislation.97 One takes from this 
that following a process of good faith consultation and negotiation prior 
to legislating complies with section 2(d). 
On the facts of B.C. Health Services the B.C. government did not 
engage in consultations or negotiations prior to legislating. In the Court’s 
section 1 analysis the Court seems to treat the government’s failure to 
consult as going to the issue of whether the legislation in question was 
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minimally impairing of a Charter right. The B.C. government’s failure to 
consult was held not to be minimally impairing.98 
Yet it would seem that the failure to consult and negotiate is what 
gave rise to the section 2(d) breach in the first place. The failure to 
consult thus appears both to determine the breach of section 2(d) and 
also to disentitle the government from relying on section 1 because it 
cannot pass the minimal impairment test when it fails to consult.  
If this is so, it is hard to see how section 1 can come to the assistance 
of the government at all, except perhaps in the situation of, “essential 
services, vital state administration, clear deadlocks and national crisis”, 
in which the Court suggests that the state may be able to justify limits on 
the collective bargaining process on an “exceptional and typically 
temporary basis”.99  
Given that the facts in B.C. Health Services involved a government 
that did not consult, the judgment does not tell us whether a process of 
good faith but unsuccessful consultation and negotiation followed by 
unilateral government action in light of the failure of negotiations will be 
analyzed under section 2(d) or section 1. This will need to be worked out 
in future cases. 
An important section 1 issue arising from the inclusion in section 
2(d) of a right to collective bargaining received only scant attention in 
the majority decision in B.C. Health Services. It is the question of 
whether the right to collective bargaining — a right to a process 
designed to improve predominately economic outcomes for workers — 
is subject to limits under section 1 of an economic or budgetary nature. 
In principle, rights of an economic nature should be subject to limits of 
an economic nature. 
Only the partial dissent of Deschamps J. acknowledged the 
importance of the economic context in the approach to section 1.100 
Justice Deschamps noted the legitimacy of the government’s concern 
with the unsustainable growth of public health care costs, of which 
labour costs were the primary component. She also noted, in particular, 
that the B.C. legislation was a response, in part, to the fact that under 
previous B.C. governments, the wages paid to the workers represented 
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by the claimant unions had risen to a level where they were 
approximately 30 per cent higher than in other provinces.101  
By contrast, the majority in B.C. Health Services dismissed as 
“suspect” the significance of budgetary concerns in its section 1 
analysis.102 Yet this ignores the fact that in the case of public sector 
labour relations, budgetary concerns impinge directly on important 
public interests relating to the availability, quality and sustainability of 
public services such as health care, education, policing, the 
administration of criminal justice, correctional services and so on.  
XI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTION 2(d) LITIGATION 
It can reasonably be anticipated that litigation of legislative initiatives 
which are claimed to infringe the section 2(d) right to collective 
bargaining will involve an inquiry — under section 2(d) or section 1 — 
into the good faith of government and trade union negotiations. Thus, 
rather than strictly adjudicating the objective purposes and effects of 
legislation, the courts will be hearing evidence and argument on the 
subjective intentions of the parties to negotiations as well as the trade 
unions’ subjective view as to what was of “importance” to them for 
potential future negotiations. It is unclear whether this will adversely 
affect the negotiating climate in public sector collective bargaining, if 
negotiations are conducted with one eye on potential constitutional 
litigation.  
XII. ADDITIONAL LABOUR RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS 
AND UNCERTAINTIES 
There are many other uncertainties arising from the B.C. Health 
Services decision beyond those discussed above.  
A number of the uncertainties are theoretical and the reasoning in 
B.C. Health Services does not provide any satisfactory guidance: 
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 Who is the right-holder? The collectivity of employees in the 
bargaining unit, the individual employees, or the bargaining agent? 
 What is the relevant association for consideration of the section 2(d) 
right to collective bargaining? The bargaining unit that exists by 
statute, the trade union that exists by voluntary membership, or the 
trade union qua bargaining agent? 
 Are section 2(d) rights alienable? Can an individual, union, or other 
relevant association waive section 2(d) rights in exchange for 
economic or other considerations? 
 What is the status of a dissenting collectivity of workers? Are 
dissenters’ section 2(d) rights subsumed in the rights of the 
collectivity of workers as a whole? Or can they assert their own 
section 2(d) rights? 
Many practical uncertainties also arise, but their resolution will 
depend in part on the answers to the above theoretical questions — 
 Is the statutory prescription of bargaining units in the typical labour 
relations regime constitutionally permissible, or should the 
determination of bargaining units be a strictly voluntary matter? 
 Can a statute re-order or restructure statutory bargaining units 
without running afoul of section 2(d)?103 
 Are the exclusive representation provisions of the typical labour 
relations model permitted, not permitted or mandatory under section 
2(d)? 
 What is encompassed by the procedural right to collective 
bargaining? Are remedies for bargaining impasse (including the 
right to strike) part of the procedural right? 
 What are the implications of the section 2(d) right for parity and 
balance between labour and management? 
At present, as we ponder the aftermath of the B.C. Health Services 
revolution, the only certainty is that all of us — government, labour, 
management, the public and the judiciary — now inhabit a novel legal 
and policy environment, the shape of which will only become clear as 
we continue to live, work, negotiate and litigate in it. 
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